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Case No. 20091033-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
MAURICIO SOSA, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant, Mauricio Sosa, appeals from convictions for possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West Supp. 2008), possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503(3) (a) (West 2004), and possession of marijuana in a drug-free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 
2008). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) 
(West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the magistrate fail to comply with the retention requirements of 
rule 40, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by allowing the affiant officer to 
walk the search warrant documents to the court clerk for filing, and if so, is 
exclusion of the evidence required? 
Standard of Review. The ultimate question of whether the trial court 
complied with rule 40's retention requirement is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. Cf State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, If 9, 22 P.3d 1242 (holding that 
ultimate question of whether trial court complied with rule 11 requirements "is 
a question of law, reviewed for correctness"). The question of what remedy to 
apply when a magistrate fails to comply with rule 40's retention requirements is 
also a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Cf. Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, 
Inc., 2009 UT 49, f 19,221 P.3d 205 (holding that "the question of what standard 
applies to determine an abuse of privilege presents a question of law, which we 
review for correctness"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES 
The following provisions are reproduced in Addendum A: Utah R. Crim. 
P. 30; Utah R. Crim. P. 40. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
On August 11, 2008, a police officer met with Judge Mark Kouris in his 
chambers on the third floor of the West Jordan courthouse and presented a 
sworn affidavit in support of a warrant to search Sosa's home. R.5; R.107:2-3. 
Acting as magistrate, Judge Kouris signed the warrant and returned it and the 
supporting affidavit to the officer. R.107:3. The officer then walked the search 
warrant documents to the clerk's office on the first floor. R.107:3-4,15. This took 
the officer no more than five minutes, and he never left the building. 
R.107:4,15.2 The clerk recorded issuance of the warrant, made and retained 
copies for filing, and returned the originals to the officer. See R.107:3-4. Three 
days later, officers executed the warrant and seized cocaine, ecstasy, 
paraphernalia, and numerous firearms from Sosa's home. See R.5. 
1
 The facts surrounding issuance of the challenged search warrant are 
based on the stipulation of defense counsel at the August 4, 2009 hearing. See 
R.107 (Addendum B). The location of the magistrate's chambers and the clerk's 
office is not in the record, but is stated in Defendant's brief. See Aplt. Brf. at 4 
n. l . The State agrees that the Court may take judicial notice of these facts. 
2
 Sosa asserts that after Judge Kouris signed the warrant, the officer had 
the search warrant documents "for an unknown period of time (less than one 
day, possibly as short as 5 minutes). Aplt. Brf. at 4. However, at the August 4, 
2009 hearing, defense counsel stipulated that the officer had the documents for 
"whatever time it would have taken the officer to go from [the magistrate's] 
office down to the warrants clerk's office." R.107. Judge Kouris, who was also 
the trial judge in this case, found that "the time frame to get from [his] chambers 
down to file it is probably five minutes or l ess , . . . based on [his] experience of 
actually making that walk before." R.15. Sosa has not challenged that finding. 
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Sosa was thereafter charged by Information with two counts of possession 
of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone with intent to distribute, possession 
of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, and possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person. R.1-5. Sosa moved to suppress the evidence on the ground 
that the magistrate failed to retain the search warrant documents as required 
under rule 40, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R.62-65,107. Following a 
hearing on the matter, the district court denied the motion. R.71-72; R.107. The 
court ruled that the magistrate complied with the retention requirements of rule 
40 because the officer was "acting as [the magistrate's] agent to carry [the 
documents] down and actually having [them] filed instead of [the magistrate] 
walking down and having [them] filed/' R.107:15-16. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sosa pled guilty to possession of cocaine 
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person, a third degree felony, and possession of marijuana in a drug-
free zone, a class A misdemeanor. R.75-76,79-92. In pleading, Sosa reserved his 
right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. R.86. The 
court later sentenced Sosa to the maximum terms of confinement on each 
offense, suspended those sentences, and placed Sosa on supervised probation 
for 36 months. R.95-97. Sosa timely appealed. R.102. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After the magistrate signed the subject search warrant, the affiant officer 
walked the search warrant documents to the clerk's office. The clerk recorded 
issuance of the warrant, made and retained copies of the search warrant 
documents for filing with the court, and returned the originals to the officer. 
Because the officer was acting as the magistrate's agent in walking the 
documents to the clerk for filing, the magistrate satisfied rule 40, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, requiring that he retain a copy of the search warrant 
documents "[a]t the time of issuance." Utah R. Crim. P. 40(i)(l). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the magistrate violated rule 40's retention 
requirement by allowing the officer to walk the documents to the clerk, any 
error was harmless. Contrary to the court of appeals decision in State v. 
Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73,206 P.3d 640, cert, granted, 215 P.3d 161 (Utah 2009), 
this Court's decision in Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79,149 P.3d 352, does not 
require exclusion of evidence for a magistrate's failure to comply with rule 40's 
retention requirement. As explained by this Court in State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 
1258 (Utah 1983), a magistrate's violation of a required warrant procedure is 
subject to harmless error analysis under rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Sosa has not alleged, much less shown, that the magistrate's error 
adversely affected his substantial rights. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE MAGISTRATE COMPLIED WITH RULE 40's RETENTION 
REQUIREMENT, BUT EVEN IF HE DID NOT, ANY ERROR 
WAS HARMLESS 
Sosa argues that by allowing the affiant officer to deliver the search 
warrant documents to the clerk for filing, the magistrate failed to strictly comply 
with rule 40's requirement that the magistrate retain those documents at the 
time they are issued. See Aplt. Brf. at 6-9. He argues that this alleged error 
requires suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. Aplt. 
Brf. at 9-11. Sosa's argument lacks merit. 
A. The magistrate complied with rule 40's retention requirement. 
Rule 40 requires issuing magistrates to retain a copy of the search warrant 
documents at the time the warrant is issued: 
At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a 
copy of the search warrant, the application and all affidavits or 
other recorded testimony on which the warrant is based and shall, 
within a reasonable time, file those sealed documents in court files 
which are secured against access by the public. . . . 
Utah R. Crim. P. 40(f)(1). As ruled by the district court, rule 40's retention 
requirement was satisfied in this case because the officer was " acting as [the 
magistrate's] agent to carry [the documents] down and actually having [them] 
filed instead of [the magistrate] walking down and having [them] filed/' 
R.107:15-16. 
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Sosa asserts that" [l]aw enforcement cannot do the magistrate's job under 
rule 40." Aplt. Brf. at 7. But nothing in the law prohibits a magistrate from 
allowing an officer to perform certain ministerial acts on his or her behalf. Cf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-218 (West 2009) (providing that a judicial officer has 
the power "to compel obedience to his lawful orders as provided by law"). 
When a probation officer gathers information for the court in connection with a 
presentence investigation report, the officer "acts as an agent of the court," 
rather than a law enforcement agent. United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 979 
(10th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 839 (1990); accord United States v. Berger, 976 
F.Supp 947, 949 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Likewise, when, under the direction of the 
magistrate, an officer delivers search warrant documents to the court clerk for 
filing, he is acting as the magistrate's agent. 
Because the officer in this case was acting as the magistrate's agent, the 
magistrate complied with rule 40's requirement that he "retain" a copy of the 
search warrant documents. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40(i)(l). This Court should 
therefore affirm the district court's ruling denying Sosa's motion to suppress. 
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B. Exclusion of the evidence is not warranted in any event, because 
the alleged error was harmless. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the magistrate did not comply with rule 
40's retention requirement when it allowed the officer to file the documents on 
• his behalf, exclusion of the evidence is not warranted. 
la Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79, f 26,206 P.3d 640, this Court "call[ed] 
upon [its] supervisory power over the courts of this state to require that they 
retain copies of all warrants issued and the documents supporting the requests 
for such warrants/ ' Contrary to the holding of the court of appeals in State v. 
Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73,1117-18, 206 P.3d 640, cert granted, 215 R3d 161 
(Utah 2009), Anderson did not require exclusion of evidence for a violation of the 
retention requirement. The Court was silent on the issue of exclusion and "le[f t] 
to [its] rule-making process the particular mechanisms for implementing this 
requirement and managing these records/' Id. 
Less than five months after Anderson issued, subsection (i)(l) was "added 
[to rule 40] in compliance with the order . . . in Anderson/' Utah R. Crim. P. 40, 
Advisory Committee Notes (i).3 Although rule 40(i) could have compelled 
exclusion of the evidence for a violation of its retention requirement, it was 
3
 Subsection (i)(2), which identifies the methods by which search warrant 
documents may be sealed and retained, "supercedes the supervisory orders of 
the Court in Anderson v. Taylor for that purpose/ ' Utah R. Crim. P. 40, Advisory 
Committee Notes (i). 
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silent on the issue of remedy. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40. Indeed, no provision in 
rule 40 addresses the remedy for a violation of the rule. Therefore, as is the case 
for violations of other rules of criminal procedure, violations of rule 40 are 
governed by rule 30: "Any er ror . . . shall be disregarded" unless it "affect[s] the 
substantial rights of a party." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). In other words, a violation 
of rule 40 does not require suppression if the error is harmless See State v. 
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989). 
This Court has long applied rule 30's harmless error standard to cases 
involving a magistrate's failure to comply with a required warrant procedure 
that does not rise to the level of constitutional error.4 In State v. Anderton, 668 
P.2d 1258,1262 (Utah 1983), the magistrate "failfed] to return the search warrant 
and the related documents to the appropriate court within fifteen days after the 
execution of the warrant," as required by statute. Relying on rule 30, the Court 
refused to exclude the evidence because the defendant had not shown that the 
4
 Sosa has not claimed that a magistrate's failure to retain search warrant 
documents is a constitutional violation, see Aplt. Brf. at 6-11, and for good 
reason. As recently reemphasized by the United States Supreme Court, the 
reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment "has never 
'depend[ed] on the law of the particular State in which the search occurs/" 
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164,172 (2008) (quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35,43 (1988)). Instead, the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment 
are limited to those set forth in the plain language of its text. See United States v. 
Grubbs, 54J U.S. 90, 97 (2006) ("rejecting efforts to expand the scope of [the 
Fourth Amendment] to embrace unenumerated matters"). 
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magistrate's failure to comply with the warrant procedure "had any adverse 
effect on [the defendants'] substantial rights/ ' Anderton, 668 P.2d at 1261-62. 
The burden of showing harm or prejudice for non-constitutional error 
rests with the defendant. See State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, \ 94, 63 P.3d 731 
(holding that" [t]he burden of showing [harm] rests on the complaining party"). 
Accordingly, exclusion is appropriate only if defendant can establish that "the 
error is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there would have been a more favorable result for 
the defendant." State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071,1073 (Utah 1989). On the other 
hand, exclusion is not appropriate if the error is "sufficiently inconsequential 
that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, | 20,20 P.3d 888. Such is the case here. 
Sosa has not challenged the validity of the search warrant itself. He has 
not claimed that the warrant lacked probable cause, that it was not supported by 
oath or affirmation, or that it did not otherwise meet the particularity 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See Aplt. Brf. at 6-13. Nor has Sosa 
alleged that the officer in this case altered the search warrant documents. See 
R.107:7-8 (defense counsel stating, "I am not insinuating that the officer did 
anything inappropriate in this case"); Aplt. Brf. at 6-11. Thus, as in Anderton, 
Sosa "ha[s] made no showing that the magistrate's [alleged] failure to comply 
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with [rule 40,s retention requirement] had any adverse affect upon his 
substantial rights, nor ha[s] [he] shown that such failure in any way 
compromised the integrity of the documents/7 Anderton, 668 P.2d at 1262. 
In sum, the magistrate's alleged rule violation "constituted nothing more 
than the failure to perform a ministerial act which did not affect the validity of 
the search warrant and the search conducted thereunder/' Id. This Court is 
thus "obliged to disregard the [error] . . . by reason of the content of Rule 30, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." See id. at 1261-62. 
Anderton's harmless error analysis is not unlike the approach taken by the 
federal courts in addressing violations of rule 40's federal counterpart—Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 41. The federal circuits have uniformly held that "suppression of 
evidence is not the proper remedy" for nonconstitutional violations of its 
warrant rule unless the defendant can "demonstrate] . . . prejudice or bad 
faith." United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 270 (4th Cir. 2000); accord United 
States v. Antrim, 389 F.3d 276,282 (1st Cir. 2004), cert, denied, 544 U.S. 936 (2005); 
United States v. Nichols, 344 F.3d 793, 799 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Omar, 
137 F.3d 359,362 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081,1087 
(10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Martinez-Zayas, 857 F.2d 122,136 (3rd Cir. 1988), 
overruled in part on other grounds in United States v. Cltapple, 985 F.2d 729 (3rd 
Cir. 1993); United States v. Stockheimer, 807 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1986), cert 
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denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987); United States v. Loyd, 721 F.2d 331, 333 (11th Or . 
1983) (per curiam); United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436,441 (5th Or . 1981); United 
States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d 1231,1235 (9th Or . 1981) (citation omitted); United 
States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2nd Cir. 1975). 
Sosa argues, however, that Dominguez's decision "to apply the 
exclusionary rule strictly in the context of Rule 40" is necessary to eliminate all 
possibility of mishandling or alteration of search warrant documents. Aplt. Brf. 
at 9-10. For example, Sosa contends that under the circumstances of this case, an 
officer could create an affidavit "with accurate, but unconvincing facts," and an 
affidavit with "embellished facts"; present the false affidavit to the magistrate; 
and after the magistrate signs the warrant, "switch out the embellished 
[affidavit] with the factually accurate (but weaker) [affidavit] and attach the 
signed warrant page before depositing the documents with [the] clerk's office a 
few minutes later." Aplt. Brf. at 10. Such a scenario "'is far too speculative, 
[and] far too remote a possibility to justify the application'" of the exclusionary 
rule. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 522 (1988)(citation 
omitted). 
As explained in Franks v. Delaware, "[t]here is a presumption of validity 
with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant." Franks v. Delaware, 
438 U.S. 154,171 (1978). Where a defendant believes the affidavit includes false 
-12-
statements (or has been tampered with), he or she can seek an appropriate 
hearing as provided under Franks. See id. at 171-72. Otherwise, this Court 
should reject" [indiscriminate application" of the exclusionary remedy, United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984), adhering instead to the time-tested 
harmless error standard of rule 30. 
* * * 
In sum, Cone invites the Court to "'let the criminal go free/ not because of 
any intentional violation of law by the constable, but simply because the 
[magistrate] has 'blundered/" United States v. Comstock, 805 F.2d 1194,1210 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (citation omitted), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987). The Court should 
decline the invitation. The exclusionary rule is "a blunt instrument, conferring 
an altogether disproportionate reward not so much in the interest of the 
defendant as in that of society at large." Burke, 517 F.2d at 386 (quotation and 
citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court should "be wary in extending the 
exclusionary rule . . . to violations which are not of constitutional magnitude," 
especially those that involve no police misconduct. Id. Evidence should not be 
excluded where, as here, there is "no constitutional violation, nor any 
prejudice." Comstock, 805 F.3d at 1210. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the decision of the 
district court below. In doing so, the State respectfully asks the Court to hold 
that (1) rule 40's retention requirement does not preclude an officer from filing 
the search warrant documents with the clerk at the magistrate's behest; and (2) a 
violation of the retention requirement does not result in the exclusion of 
evidence where the error is harmless. 
Respectfully submitted July 21, 2010. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEFFREY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addenda 
ADDENDUM A 
Rules 30 & 40, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 30. Errors and Defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
Rule 40. Search Warrants. 
(a) Definitions. 
As used in this rule: 
(a)(1) "Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m. and ending at 10 p.m. 
local time. 
(a)(2) "Recorded" or "recording" includes the original recording of testimony, 
a return or other communication or any copy, printout, facsimile, or other 
replication that is intended by the person making the recording to have the same 
effect as the original. 
(a)(3) "Search warrant" is an order issued by a magistrate in the name of the 
state and directed to a peace officer, describing with particularity the thing, place, 
or person to be searched and the property or evidence to be seized and includes an 
original written or recorded warrant or any copy, printout, facsimile or other 
replica intended by the magistrate issuing the warrant to have the same effect as 
the original. 
(b) Grounds for issuance. 
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search warrant if there is 
probable cause to believe it: 
(b)(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(b)(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being used to commit or 
conceal the commission of an offense; or 
(b)(3) is evidence of illegal conduct. 
(c) Conditions precedent to issuance. 
(c)(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and shall particularly describe the person or place to be 
searched and the person, property, or evidence to be seized. 
(c)(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in 
the possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause 
shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to the 
alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by the 
magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by subpoena, 
or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if 
sought by subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant issued, the 
magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such conditions that reasonably afford 
protection of the following interests of the person or entity in possession of such 
evidence: 
(c)(2)(A) protection against unreasonable interference with normal business; 
(c)(2)(B) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential 
sources of information; or 
(c)(2)(C) protection against prior or direct restraints on constitutionally 
protected rights. 
(d) Search warrant served in readable form. 
A copy of a search warrant shall be served in a readable form upon the person 
or place to be searched. 
(e) Time for service—Officer may request assistance. 
(e)(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that it be served in 
the daytime, unless the affidavit or recorded testimony states sufficient grounds to 
believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to its being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason; in which case 
the magistrate may insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or night. 
(e)(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of 
issuance. Any search warrant not executed within this time shall be void and shall 
be returned to the court or magistrate as not executed. 
(e)(3) An officer may request other persons to assist in conducting the search. 
(f) Receipt for property taken. 
The officer, when seizing property pursuant to a search warrant, shall give a 
receipt to the person from whom it was seized or in whose possession it was 
found. If no person is present, the officer shall leave the receipt in the place where 
the property was found. 
(g) Return—Inventojy of property taken. 
The officer, after execution of the warrant, shall promptly make a signed return 
of the warrant to a magistrate of the issuing court and deliver a written or recorded 
inventory of anything seized, stating the place where it is being held. 
(h) Safekeeping of property. 
The officer seizing the property shall be responsible for its safekeeping and 
maintenance until the court otherwise orders. 
(i) Magistrate to retain and file copies—Documents sealed for twenty days-
Forwarding of record to court with jurisdiction. 
(i)(l) At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the 
search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded testimony on 
which the warrant is based and shall, within a reasonable time, file those sealed 
documents in court files which are secured against access by the public. Those 
documents shall remain sealed until twenty days following the issuance of the 
warrant unless that time is extended or reduced under Section (m). Unsealed 
search warrant documents shall be filed in the court record available to the public. 
(i)(2) Sealing and retention of the file may be accomplished by: 
(i)(2)(A) placing paper documents or storage media in a sealed envelope and 
filing the sealed envelope in a court file not available to the public; 
(i)(2)(B) storing the documents by electronic or other means under the control 
of the court in a manner reasonably designed to preserve the integrity of the 
documents and protect them against disclosure to the public during the period in 
which they are sealed; or 
(i)(2)(C) filing through the use of an electronic filing system operated by the 
State of Utah which system is designed to transmit accurate copies of the 
documents to the court file without allowing alteration to the documents after 
issuance of the warrant by the magistrate. 
(j) Findings required for service without notice. 
If the magistrate finds upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may 
be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to 
any person if notice were given, the magistrate may direct that the officer need not 
give notice of authority and purpose before entering the premises to be searched. 
(k) Violation of health, safety, building, or animal cruelty laws or ordinances-
Warrant to obtain evidence. 
In addition to other warrants provided by this rule, a magistrate, upon a 
showing of probable cause to believe a state, county, or city law or ordinance, has 
been violated in relation to health, safety, building, or animal cruelty, may issue a 
warrant for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a violation. A warrant may be 
obtained from a magistrate upon request of a peace officer or state, county, or 
municipal health, fire, building, or animal control official only after approval by a 
prosecuting attorney. A search warrant issued under this section shall be directed 
to any peace officer within the county where the warrant is to be executed, who 
shall serve the warrant. Other concerned personnel may accompany the officer. 
(I) Remotely communicated search warrants. 
(/)(1) Means of communication. When reasonable under the circumstances, a 
search warrant may be issued upon sworn or affirmed testimony of a person who 
is not in the physical presence of the magistrate, provided the magistrate is 
satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. All 
communication between the magistrate and the peace officer or prosecuting 
attorney requesting the warrant may be remotely transmitted by voice, image, text, 
or any combination of those, or by other means. 
(/)(2) Communication to be recorded. All testimony upon which the magistrate 
relies for a finding of probable cause shall be on oath or affirmation. The 
testimony and content of the warrant shall be recorded. Recording shall be by 
writing or by mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by other 
means. 
(/)(3) Issuance. If the magistrate finds that probable cause is shown, the 
magistrate shall issue a search warrant. 
(/)(4) Signing warrant. Upon approval, the magistrate may direct the peace 
officer or the prosecuting attorney requesting a warrant from a remote location to 
sign the magistrate's name on a warrant at a remote location. 
(/)(5) Filing of warrant and testimony. The warrant and recorded testimony 
shall be retained by and filed with the court pursuant to Section (i). Filing may be 
by writing or by mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by 
other means. 
(/)(6) Usable copies made available. Except as provided in Sections (i) and (m) 
of this rule, any person having standing may request and shall be provided with a 
copy of the warrant and a copy of the recorded testimony submitted in support of 
the application for the warrant. The copies shall be provided in a reasonably usable 
form. 
(m) Sealing and Unsealing of Search Warrant Documents. 
(m)(l) Application for sealing of documents related to search warrants. A 
prosecutor or peace officer may make a written or otherwise recorded application 
to the court to have documents or records related to search warrants sealed for a 
time in addition to the sealing required by Subsection (i)(l). Upon a showing of 
good cause, the court may order the following documents to be sealed: 
(m)(l)(A) applications for search warrants; 
(m)(l)(B) search warrants; 
(m)(l)(C) affidavits or other recorded testimony upon which the search warrant 
is based; 
(m)(l)(D) the application, affidavits or other recorded testimony and order for 
sealing the documents. 
(m)(2) Sealing of search warrant documents. Search warrant documents are 
public record that may be sealed in entirety or in part and not placed in the public 
file if all or part of the information in them would: 
(m)(2)(A) cause a substantial risk of harm to a person's safety; 
(m)(2)(B) pose a clearly unwarranted invasion of or harm to a person's 
reputation or privacy; or 
(m)(2)(C) pose a serious impediment to the investigation. 
Sealed documents shall be maintained in a file not available to the public. If a 
document is not sealed in its entirety, the court may order a copy of the document 
with the sealed portions redacted to be placed in the public file and an un-redacted 
copy to be placed in the sealed file. Except as required by Section (i), no document 
may be designated as "Filed under Seal" or "Confidential" unless it is 
accompanied by a court order sealing the document. 
(m)(3) Unsealing of documents. Any person having standing may file a motion 
to unseal search warrant documents with notice to the prosecutor and law 
enforcement agency. If the prosecutor or law enforcement agency files an 
appropriate and timely objection to the unsealing, the court may hold a hearing on 
the motion and objection. Where no objection to unsealing the documents is filed, 
the defendant may prepare an order for entry by the court. The court may order the 
unsealing of the documents or order copies of the documents to be delivered to a 
designated person without unsealing the documents and require the person 
receiving the documents not to disclose the contents to any other person without 
the authorization of the court. 
(m)(4) Length of time documents may remain sealed. The documents may 
remain sealed until the court finds, for good cause, that the records should be 
unsealed. 
[Approved effective May 2, 2005; amended effective April 30, 2007.] 
Advisory Committee Notes 
(a) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-201 Utah Code Ann. 
(b) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-202 Utah Code Ann. 
(c) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-203 Utah Code Ann. 
(d) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-204 Utah Code Ann. 
(e) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-205 Utah Code Ann. 
(f) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-206 Utah Code Ann. The statute 
contained the words "Failure to give or leave a receipt does not render the evidence seized 
inadmissible at trial." This rule is not a departure from that original legislative intent. While the 
committee did not consider it necessary to address admissibility in a procedural rule, the 
elimination of that language does not suggest that failure to comply with the receipt requirement 
should be a basis for exclusion of the evidence seized. 
(g) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-207 Utah Code Ann. 
(h) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-208 Utah Code Ann. 
(i) Subsection (1) is added in compliance with the order of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79. Subsection (2) is added to allow for a planned electronic search 
warrant system operated by the Utah Bureau Of Criminal Identification, or other systems which 
might be employed by a magistrate. This provision supercedes the supervisory orders of the Court 
in Anderson v. Taylor for that purpose. 
(j) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-210(2) Utah Code Ann. 
(k) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-211 Utah Code Ann. 
(1) This section was formerly Rule 40 Remotely Communicated Search Warrants. Terms used 
are intended to be interpreted liberally in order to facilitate remote communications as a means of 
applying for and issuing search warrants while at the same time preserving the integrity of the 
probable cause application and the terms of warrants that are authorized. 
(m) (New section) 
Cross References 
Remotely communicated search warrant issued under this rule, see § 77-23-204. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on August 4, 2009) 
THE COURT: Let's call the Sosa case, then. We have — 
is Mr. Hill here? 
MR. HILL: Yes. 
THE COURT: He is. All right. Let's call the case 
of the State of Utah vs. Mr. Mauricio — am I pronouncing that 
right, sir? 
MR. SOSA: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mauricio Sosa. Good afternoon, Mr. Sosa. 
The case is 08142177. I've had an opportunity to read all the 
briefs that have been submitted, as well as the cases. 
The first thing I need to ask you, Mr. Nakamura, just 
so I understand exactly what facts we're dealing with because I 
think Mr. Hill — actually both of you, because I think the facts 
are stipulated here. If I understand the facts you're saying, an 
officer comes -- I don't know if this is — did I sign this 
warrant, by the way? 
MR. NAKAMURA: You did, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. So this is good reflection on me. 
Thank you. 
MR. NAKAMURA: I was trying to keep that — 
THE COURT: I appreciate that. So the officer came into 
my chambers. I signed the warrant. He then took the warrant 
from my office, went downstairs and filed it with the clerk? 
-3-
1 MR. NAKAMURA: Well, I think it's a little bit more 
2 involved than that. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. NAKAMURA: He came into your chambers. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. NAKAMURA: Presented you with the proposed warrant, 
7 along with the affidavit and any supporting documents. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. NAKAMURA: The Court did what it deemed was 
10 appropriate at that point, which I believe was to sign the 
11 warrant. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. NAKAMURA: Then returned the warrant, the affidavit 
14 and all supporting documents — basically, all the documents that 
15 the officer came into the chambers with --
16 THE COURT: To the officer. 
17 MR. NAKAMURA: — back to the officer. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MR. NAKAMURA: The officer then exited chambers, went 
2 0 downstairs and then went to the warrants clerk, I assume --
21 THE COURT: And signed off on that. 
22 MR. NAKAMURA: -- who then takes that whole bulk of 
23 documents --
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. NAKAMURA: — records it m , gives back to the 
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MR. NAKAMURA: No. 
THE COURT: There's — and the amount of time roughly 
from the third floor of my office down to the first floor was 
probably within the range of maybe 10 to 15 minutes? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Yeah, and that -- exactly, Judge. 
THE COURT: If that? 
MR. NAKAMURA: That's correct. I mean whatever time it 
would have taken the officer to go from your office down to the 
warrants clerk's office is the only time. 
THE COURT: Sure. Okay. 
MR. NAKAMURA: I think the issue that we're raising in 
that regard, though, Judge, is the same concern that was raised 
in Anderson -- the second concern raised in Anderson, that the 
Dominguez case was ultimately based upon. When you look at the 
Dominguez case, it obviously goes to Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. NAKAMURA: The general issue is what does that rule 
really mean. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
-5-
1 MR. NAKAMURA: We now know from the Dominguez case that 
2 what the rule means is that it places certain responsibilities 
3 upon the magistrate. In fact, on paragraph 11 in the opinion, 
4 they state, "We conclude that Rule 40(i) of the Utah Rules of 
5 Criminal Procedure requires the magistrate" — italicized — 
6 uto make and keep a copy of the search warrant and supporting 
7 documents. It is not sufficient for the peace officer alone to 
8 retain this information and subsequently supply it to the Court," 
9 which is exactly what happened here. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. So we're clear — crystal clear, in 
11 the Dominguez case it was a telephonic warrant, correct? 
12 MR. NAKAMURA: Right. 
13 THE COURT: It was unrecorded, correct? 
14 MR. NAKAMURA: Right. 
15 THE COURT: So the next morning in this case, not only 
16 did the magistrate not have a copy of -- well, the magistrate had 
17 absolutely no copy of what happened the night before; is that 
18 correct? 
19 MR. NAKAMURA: That's correct. 
20 THE COURT: And how many hours elapsed between the time 
21 the magistrate issued the warrant and the warrant was presented 
22 to the Court? 
23 MR. NAKAMURA: A number of hours, but I would suggest 
24 that when you look at the Dominguez case, the facts of this 
25 Dominguez case, and indeed the facts of the Anderson case are not 
-6-
the material information necessarily relied upon by the Court to 
come to its ruling, but rather an interpretation of the rule. I 
guess that's what I would respond to. 
In the State's memorandum, they're saying, "Wait, 
the facts are distinguishable." Well, they are indeed 
distinguishable, but they are still facts that do not comply with 
the rule. When you look at Anderson and now the Dominguez case, 
those facts are different. Anderson is different from Dominguez, 
Dominguez is different from Anderson. 
Indeed the federal cases that they looked to in deciding 
the Dominguez case are slightly different as well factually, but 
the rule is the same. Thus, we then come down to the issue of, 
"Well, how strictly shall we interpret Rule 40?" 
The Dominguez case answers that, too. They indicate, 
"Well, this is a question of first impression: for us." They say 
in paragraph 17, "Because this is an issue of first impression, 
we are left to decide for the first time how strictly Rule 40 
should be enforced in Utah." They go on to state that it shall 
be strictly enforced. 
Essentially in -- and they state that the Anderson --
the Supreme Court in Anderson, their ruling there. They say, 
"We assume that the Utah Supreme Court wishes this rule to be 
followed strictly now that it has been implemented." Then as 
they go on they conclude with, "Thus, Rule 4 0 is unambiguous in 
setting forth the Court's responsibility when issuing search 
-7-
1 warrants, including those sought telephonically" — voila, the 
2 facts aren't distinguishable ones. "Accordingly, we reverse." 
3 But they go on to say that it is to be strictly followed. 
4 However, there's on other issue that I think you have to 
5 look at. You have to go back to Anderson, because the Dominguez 
6 case really relied upon the Supreme Court's Anderson case to come 
7 to the ruling that they did in saying that Rule 4 0 must be 
8 strictly followed and strictly interpreted. 
9 When we look at the Anderson case, which they quote in 
10 their decision, they cite two concerns that exist when the rule 
11 is not strictly followed. The second concern is exactly the 
12 concern that could be at play here. 
13 On paragraph -- it's in paragraph — 
14 THE COURT: Paragraph 22? 
15 MR. NAKAMURA: Well, it's in paragraph 8 of the opinion, 
16 but paragraph — apparently 2 of the Anderson opinion. Halfway 
17 down it says, "Second, it allows for the possibility that 
18 affidavits and other court records may be mishandled or even 
19 altered without detection. When the records upon which the 
20 magistrate acts in issuing a warrant are handled by persons other 
21 than court personnel prior to it being filed with the Court, the 
22 Court has no basis for confidence in the accuracy, authenticity 
23 or completeness of those documents." 
24 What I'm suggesting, your Honor, is while I am not 
25 insinuating that the officer did anything inappropriate in this 
-8-
1 case, and while I will acknowledge that the period of time that 
2 the officer had all the documents alone would have been fairly 
3 short, it still would have allowed for the possibility for some 
4 alteration to occur in the affidavit or supporting documents. 
5 If you will, the officer could come into the Court with 
6 one affidavit designed to pass muster, if you will, present it to 
7 the Court. The Court reviews it, relies upon it, signs off on 
8 the warrant, gives it all back to the officer. As the officer 
9 is leaving the court, another affidavit and another supporting 
10 document is in there, perhaps one more accurately reflecting the 
11 facts of the case. That's the one that ultimately gets filed. 
12 The concern raised here is well, then how in the 
13 world if the Court doesn't retain it at that point when they're 
14 reviewed and signed, how do we know -- how would the Court know 
15 what documents were reviewed and relied upon? That's exactly 
16 what happened here. 
17 If it were challenged, the Court would be left with, 
18 ''Well, what did you present? I thought the affidavit I read 
19 said this, this, this and this, but this doesn't say this, this, 
20 this and this. But I have no way to know." Why? Because the 
21 documents ultimately all got put into the possession of the 
22 officer, and there would be no way for a Court to then determine 
23 whether those were the original documents that they reviewed and 
24 relied upon in issuing the warrant. 
2 5 So while I acknowledge that the facts m this case are 
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1 distinct from Anderson, they're clearly distinct from Dominguez. 
2 The Dominguez case is not — the ruling in the Dominguez case is 
3 not really factually based. It's really an interpretation of a 
4 statute or a rule. That's what it's based upon. The rule is 
5 clear, and it puts clear responsibilities on Courts, and it 
6 requires strict adherence to the rule. Under the rule, this 
7 wasn't followed. 
8 The very reason why the Court so ruled that it should 
9 be strictly followed is a concern that very much exists in this 
10 matter, i.e., the Court who reviews and signs no longer has 
11 custody of those original documents. Once that occurs — I 
12 don't care if it's for a nanosecond — there's no way for a Court 
13 to then upon challenge to say, "What did I actually review?" 
14 There's just no way to do it. 
15 When you look at the totality of the Dominguez opinion, 
16 and even going to the Anderson opinion, and even the federal 
17 court decisions that Court of Appeals looked to for guidance in 
18 coming to this ruling, that is of a paramount concern. 
19 As it states in the federal cases, they have a situation 
20 whei;e if an officer or an agent calls a federal judge for a 
21 search warrant telephonically it's recorded, the entirety of it. 
22 It's recorded, retained by the Court. So if there's any question 
23 about the information that the Court relied upon in issuing the 
24 warrant, they've got that recorded. 
25 When you look at all the other decisions that they 
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1 reviewed in coming to their opinion, that's exactly what they 
2 were looking for. In this case, we don't have it. We don't have 
3 it because even for a brief moment that officer did not retain 
4 all the documents. That's an opportunity that point 2 in the 
5 Anderson decision directly relates to. 
6 So we contend that the ruling of Dominguez is Rule 4 0 
7 should be strictly followed, and it wasn't strictly followed 
8 here. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. NAKAMURA: So we're asking for the same relief that 
11 was offered in Dominguez as well. 
12 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hill? 
13 MR. HILL: Your Honor, the Dominguez case — obviously 
14 the facts — and I don't think it's in dispute that the facts are 
15 vastly different than what we're dealing with here. I mean it's 
16 a telephonic warrant where the officer -- I mean I'm not going 
17 to — I'm sure the Court knows the facts, but they're dealing 
18 with a telephonic warrant where the Judge never actually had any 
19 copy of the affidavits, never made any recording on it, and then 
20 subsequently receives this on the return of service. 
21 I think that was the main issue that Dominguez was 
22 dealing with. They say in — paragraph 11 of the Dominguez 
23 says, "We conclude that Rule 40(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
24 Procedure requires the magistrate to make and keep a copy of the 
25 search warrant and supporting documents." Then the next 
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sufficient for the peace officer alone to 
ion and subsequently supply 
cifically speaking to those 
I don't think we have that 
king it and then (inaudible) 
it to the Court. " 
— that set of 
issue. It's — 
supplying it to 
the Court. He's taking it, and out of convenience for the Court, 
I believe, walking it down to the clerk, where we verified in 
this case that it was logged in, that it was — a copy was made 
and kept on file with the Court. 
I think the concerns that Anderson and Dominguez had 
were that if this officer is allowed to retain these affidavits 
and then subsequently bring it back and (inaudible) to the Court, 
then this defendant has no way to go back and attack the validity 
of the probable cause included in that affidavit that was 
presented to the magistrate. 
In this case I just don't think that there are those 
same concerns. The officer gives your Honor the affidavit. 
It was signed. It was filed. There's a copy of it there. 
If there's any need, or the defendant wants to come back and 
attack the validity of that probable cause, he's able to do that. 
There's a copy that was kept on file with the Court. 
If there's another copy out there, obvi -- that the 
officer changed or altered in any way, it's easily detected with 
what's been on file with the Court. I think we're grasping at 
straws to say that an officer is going to walk out of your 
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1 courtroom and on his way to — and I know that allegation hasn't 
2 been made, but in that brief time walking down to the clerk's 
3 office he's going to add a bunch of information or attack 
4 something else there. I just don't think it's a valid concern 
5 in this case. 
6 The language that they use as quoting Anderson, in 
7 the Dominguez there are concerns about the accuracy, authenticity 
8 and completeness of the affidavits. Again, I think in this case 
9 there's — there are ways to make sure that that's not the case. 
10 We can compare what was filed and what comes back from 
11 the officer in the return of service. I just don't think that 
12 intervening — you know, I would (inaudible) that it would be 
13 less than 10 minutes — I would say five or less for him to walk 
14 down and file it with the Court, that it's the exact same thing 
15 that came from your Honor's hand. 
16 I just don't think that the facts are similar enough in 
17 this case, or the concern is similar enough in this case as they 
18 were in the Anderson or the Dominguez case to apply that -- well, 
19 to find the same result that the Dominguez Court found. 
20 THE COURT; Okay. Thank you. 
21 MR. NAKAMURA: One last comment, Judge. Here's the 
22 problem. When you look at the second point that the Anderson 
23 Court makes, they are very specific the documents that they're 
24 concerned about, and they talk about the affidavit and the 
25 supporting documents. They don't talk about the warrant. 
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Then you say, "Well, wait a second, why are they being 
so specific on the affidavit and the supporting documents?" 
Because those are documents, a duplication of which nobody would 
know, the Court included. They are documents of which that could 
be drafted, executed without having anybody else know that there 
are two. 
The State makes an issue about, "Well, there just isn't 
enough time for any kind of opportunity for impropriety to exist. 
It's minutes, if that." But there doesn't need to be any time, 
because the documents that the Anderson Court was concerned about 
are documents for which duplicates could be made and nobody would 
be aware of those duplicates, and inserted into the original 
documents within seconds, not minutes, if that's what was 
desired. 
I would concede that if we are just dealing with the 
case language of Rule 40, the case language of this places clear 
responsibilities on the magistrate who shall retain, the case 
language of this rule is to be strictly interpreted, perhaps the 
State might have some room to say, "Well, but the deviation here 
is de minimis. It's de minimis and therefore not material." 
But when you then look at the Anderson opinion and 
the concerns they raise, and how the Dominguez Court relied upon 
the Anderson opinion to come up with their rulings of strict 
compliance, and because the reasoning or one of the concerns in 
Anderson is exactly the concern here, now you say, "Well, wait a 
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second. You can't really get around that." 
The language of Dominguez is real clear; strictly 
follow it, strictly interpret it. Rule 40 is real clear; the 
magistrate shall do this. If you even look at the first point 
in the Anderson case, they're clear about what that concern is. 
They make very specific, if you will, notes about that first 
concern, and that note is, "If it leaves the Court without any 
record of the warrant or the materials supporting its issuance 
until after the warrant is executed and a return is filed." 
Well, what it's saying there is, "Gee, you know, all 
that kind of time while the thing is being held, while it's being 
held in preparation for execution, there it is that concern." 
They were very specific about the parameters of that 
concern. If they thought that well, you know, really the 
parameters should be brcader on point 2, they would have said so, 
but they weren't. 
What they say in point 2 is very clear. "When the 
records upon which the magistrate acts in issuing a warrant are 
handled by persons other than the court personnel prior to being 
filed with the Court" — not prior to being executed, not after 
being executed, just filed with the Court — "the Court has no 
basis for confidence in the accuracy, authenticity or 
completeness of those records." 
What I'm obviously suggesting is they were contemplating 
even this situation. Why? Because the language is very clear. 
-15-
1 They were very deliberate in the words that they chose. 
2 When you think about how this worked in this case, we 
3 can see the application, primarily because the affidavit and the 
4 supporting documents can have duplicates without anybody knowing 
5 and being inserted thereafter, and then that document — not 
6 the one that the Court looked at, but the one that was inserted 
7 between the Court's signature and the filing gets filed with the 
8 warrants clerk. 
9 When that gets detected by defense Counsel and 
10 challenged, the Court now is without any record to ensure that 
11 those documents filed were the same documents that it reviewed. 
12 I don't think rhere's any question about that. 
13 It does sound like it's a de minimis argument until you 
14 carefully read the Dominguez opinion and you carefully read the 
15 Anderson opinion and the concerns, and thus that's why we believe 
16 it has application even to these set of facts, Judge. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Well, given the fact that the 
18 stipulation is that these documents, No. 1, never left the 
19 courthouse, and No. 2, the time frame to get from my chambers 
20 down to file it is probably five minutes or less, I would 
21 say -- that's based on my experience of actually making that walk 
22 before -- I would say that this is unquestionably a de minimis 
23 argument, and I reject the premise that Mr. Nakamura is making 
24 here. 
2 5 First of all, when the officer takes those documents 
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1 from me, they are acting as my agent to carry it down and 
2 actually have it filed instead of me actually walking down and 
3 having it filed. When we're splitting hairs this small, when 
4 the — as the Anderson says, the possibility that they may be 
5 mishandled, that gives you a little bit more time frame. They 
6 don't think that person is going to mishandle something in five 
7 minutes. Or that it might be altered without detection. Again, 
8 I would guess that they're looking at something with a much 
9 larger time frame. 
10 If in fact we were to ascribe the nefarious — I guess 
11 motivation of the officer that Mr. Nakamura is saying, saying, 
12 "What I'm going to do is take some fakes in there, have the 
13 gov — have the Judge look at the good ones, and then substitute 
14 it out as I'm walking for that five minute walk down," well, then 
15 I think we'd have to take it the next step, then, and say, "Well, 
16 then the Judge shouldn't be allowed to leave those things in his 
17 inbox in his office for his clerk to be taking them down, because 
18 there's always a chance an officer will be back in the halls, and 
19 he might sneak in there and switch them out anyway." 
20 Well, if we're going to ascribe that sort of motivations 
21 to the officer, I think we've got a lot bigger problems than what 
22 we're dealing with here, and I don't believe that to be the case. 
23 So based upon that, then, I find that in fact this was 
24 in strict reading of Rule 40. The way this was handled was the 
25 way it should have been handled, and I don't see any problem with 
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So I'm going to deny Mr. Nakamura's motion. 
Now that having been said, Mr. Nakamura, where do we 
to go from here? Do we need another date? 
MR. NAKAMURA: I think we just need a final pre-trial, 
Honor, to see where this is going. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do we have a t r i a l d a t e ? 
MR. NAKAMURA: I d o n ' t t h i n k we have a t r i a l d a t e s e t . 
MR. HILL: I t ' s ( i n a u d i b l e ) . 
THE COURT: All right. Two weeks out, is that what 
we're thinking? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Yeah, that's fine. 
THE COURT: Okay. How does the 17th at 8:30 look? Does 
that work for you? Is the 18th better? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Well, that week I'm scheduled to be out 
of town, but it's not coming together yet. 
THE COURT: Are you? Okay. How does August 31st at 
7:30 — or 8:30 look? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Well, August 31st at 1:30 looks grand. 
THE COURT: That will be your time, then. August 31st 
at 1:30 for another roll call. Then at that point we'll get it 
either on a trial track or figure out where we're headed from 
there. 
MR. NAKAMURA: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Mr. Xaix? 
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of 
THE COURT: Would you mind? 
MR. HILL: Sure. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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